Agnes Payotelis v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Security : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) 
1983 
Agnes Payotelis v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Department of Employment Security : Brief of Respondent 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2 
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the 
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act, 
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.David L. Wilkinson and Floyd G. Astin; Attorney Respondent 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Respondent, Payotelis v. Utah Indus Comm'n, No. 19127 (1983). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4675 
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 




BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, D&Pi!M:f'l:'llilllilllil 
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Respondent. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
ly. JOHN L. BLACK, JR. · • •1 Eut Fourth South 
laltLakeClty, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 328-8891 
Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE ................................. . 
DISPOSITION BELOW ............................................... . 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW.......... ... . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . .... ... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................... 3 
ARGUMENT................................................... . . . . . 3 
POINT I.......................................................... 3 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE 
COURT WILL AFFIRM THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH 
ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
PO I NT I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
THE FINDINGS AND DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COM-
MISSION ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EV! DENCE. 
POINT III........................................................ 8 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT APPELLANT CONTACT 2 to 3 POTEN-
TIAL EMPLOYERS IN PERSON EACH WEEK IS CONSISTENT WITH 
THE LAW AND rs REASONABLE. 
POINT IV......................................................... 9 
THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH THE COMMISSION TERMINATED UN-
EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS TO CLAIMANT GRAY DID NOT VIOLATE 
DUE PROCESS. 
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 3 
CASES C !TED 
Cal1torn10 Department of Human Resources Development 
v • .iav-il.-402IF.s.-121 (1971)............................... io,12 
I 0 IO- v_ Ad1111n1strator, Unemployment Compensation 
Act, 223 A. 2Cf lTTTConn., 1966) .......................... . 9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
CASES CITED (Continued) 
Denby v. Board of Review, 567 P. 2d 626 (Utah, 1977) .•......•... 
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379,389, 95 S.Ct. 533,540, 
42 L.Ed. 2d 521 (1975) ••...•••.••••.••...•....•..••........ 
PAG[ 
Gocke v. Wiesley, 420 P. 2d 44,46 (Utah, 1966).................. 4,' 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S., 254,264, 90 S.Ct. at 1011,1018..... 9,! 
Graves v. Meystrik, 425 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Mo., 1977), affirmed 
--431 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2164, 53 L.Ed. 2d 220 (1977) ....•.• 
Hurd v. Board of Review, 638 P. 2d 544 (Utah, 1981) •.•••..•.•... 
Jones v. Administrator, Unem loyment Com ensation 
--Act, 228 A. 2d 807 Conn., 1966 ••.•••••..•••••••.•.••••..• 
v. of Review, 477 P. 2d 587 (Utah, 1970) .•.••.... 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976)....................... 10,11, 
Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial 
Commission, 139 P. 2d 208, 211 (Utah, 1943)................. 4, 
Redd v. Texas Employment Commission, 431 S.W. 2d 16 
-- (Tx., 1968) ..•••••.•••••.••••.••••.•••••.••.•.•...•.•...•... 
Salt Lake City Corporation v. Board of Review 657 P. 2d 
1312, 1316 (Utah, 1982) ••••••.••••.•...•.••••.•.•.•.••.•.... 
Salt Lake County v. Industrial Commission, 120 P. 2d 321 
(Utah, 1940) •••.••.••••.••••••••..•.••••.••.•..••.•.•....... 
Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp. 922 (Conn., 1973) .••....••..... 
Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 333 F. Supp. 
(S.D.N.Y., 1971 ), affirmed 405 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 
1185, 31 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1972) ..•.•.•...••.•......•.•...•..... 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
CASES CITED (Continued) 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Generdl Rules of Adjudication, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
-Departme-nf oFEm-pToyment Security, Rule A7l-07-2:1.e.(l ) ••••.......• 13 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended {Pocket Supplement, 1981) 
Section 35-4-4(c) ••.•.......•..•••...••.•.•.••.•......•...•... 1,2,4,8 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended {Pocket Supplement, 1981) 
Section 35-4-6{d) .......••••••.••.••..••..........•..••.•.•...•. 1,22 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 35-4-10 •••••••••••.•••. •••••••••••••• .•••••.•. 13 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953' 35-4-lO{i ) ••••••••..••••••••.••.••..••.••.•..•. 1 
Ut dh Code Annotated, 1953, Section 708-5-105 ••••.•.•••.••••.••.•...••.••• 21 
Uta 11 Code Annotated, 1953, Section 708-5-112 ••••....•......• ....... ...• 22 
iii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AGNES PA YOTELIS, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT 
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 19127 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pur-
suant to Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking 
1udic1al review of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, which denied unemployment benefits to the Appellant, Agnes 
Payotelis, pursuant to Section 35-4-4(c), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended (Pocket Supplement, 1981), on the grounds that during certain weeks 
t<ir which she claimed benefits she failed to demonstrate a "good faith" 
active etfort to seek employment as required for eligibility. This disquali-
f,c,1i ""' Pstabl1shed an overpayment liability in the amount of $402, pursuant 
·,, '! l'>n 3'.i-4-6(d), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supple-
- l -
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Department Representative's decision, dated November 9, 1982, der 
unemployment benefits effective October 3, 1982, on the grounds that 
lant had not made an active effort to find work as required for eligib:r· 
under the provisions of Section 35-4-4(c), Utah Code Annotated 195], 
amended (Pocket Supplement, 1981 ). This decision established an overpay.; 
liability in the amount of $536. Plaintiff appealed to an Appeal Refe 
who modified the decision of the Department Representative in a deci 
dated January 4, 1983, to deny benefits from October 3, 1982 through rv 
ber 23, 1982; to allow benefits for the weeks ended October 30, Novembe' 
Nov"mber 13, November 20, and November 27, 1982; and to deny benefits ef·, 
tive November 28, 1982 and continuing until a change in facts or cond1t·. 
was demonstrated. The Appeal Referee's decision reduced the overpayment 
$402. The Appellant appealed to the Board of Review of the Industriai: 
mission of Utah, which by decision issued March 29, 1983, in Case No.11· 
5336, 83-BR-39, affirmed the decision of the Appeal Referee. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Appellant seeks a finding of the Court that the Appellant did in· 
make a diligent job search effort that demonstrated her continuing at·, 
ment to the labor market and such actions fully complied with requir· 
of Utah law. Respondent seeks affi rmance of the decisions of the 
Referee and Board of Review. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
11ro·,1,,indent agrees with Preliminary Statement and Statement of Facts 
,Pt turth in Appellant's Brief, however, notes that for the total period of 
c11squal1fication, Appellant made only two in-person employer contacts and 
six telephone contacts. In particular: For the week ended October 9, 1982, 
Appellant made no in-person contacts and contacted Rid A Pest, Pennock Pest 
uintrol and R & R Pest Control by telephone. (R.0064) For the week ended 
October 16, 1982, Appellant contacted Wasatch Exterminators in person, and 
Columbia Pest Control by telephone. (R.0064) For the week ended October 
23, 1982, Appellant made no in-person contacts and contacted Utah Pest Con-
trol and Holiday Pest Control by telephone. (R.0064) For the period from 
November 28, 1982 to her hearing on December 9, 1982, Appellant contacted 
only Zeeman's Manufacturing which was an in-person contact. (R.0036) 
ARGUMENT 
PO I NT I 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commis-
··''"'Jn.I the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be dis-
'·ir·r11·I Martinez v. Board of Review, 477 P. 2d 587 (Utah, 1970). In the 
- 3 -
P. 2d 208, 211 (Utah, 1943), this Court held: 
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain the 
findings and decision of the Industrial Commission, this 
court may not set aside the decision even though on a 
review of the record we might well have reached a differ-
ent result. 
With specific reference to the question of availability, this Couc1 , 
stated: 
It is our duty to examine the record and to affirm the 
decision unless we can say as a matter of law that the 
conclusion on the question of "available for work" was 
wrong because only the opposite conclusion could be 
drawn from the facts. Gocke v. Wiesley, 420 P. 2d 44,46 
(Utah, 1966); citing Industrial Com-
120 P. 2d 321 (Utah, 1940). 
POI NT I I 
THE FINDINGS AND DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Section 35-4-4(c) requires, by direct statutory language, that an '/c 
ployment insurance claimant make an active and good faith effort to''· 
employment each week that he files for benefits. 
4. An unemployed individual shall be eligible to re-
ceive benefits with respect to any week only if it has 
been found by the commission that: 
(c) He is able to work and is available for work dur-
ing each and every week with respect to which he made 
a claim for benefits under this Act, and acted in good 
faith in an active effort to secure employment 
(Emphasis added.) 
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r,11111111,111 the Utah lmployment Security Act does not require that a claim-
.,. 1 ... "n'i"'JPrJ in a sedrch for work for any given number of hours each day 
,, ... , " l'r•JVP he is Pngaged in a good faith active effort work search, 
l'"' ruurt. has held that a claimant must be unequivocally exposed to the 
len,ir ,11arfpt and must show more than a passive willingness to gain employ-
''"1. liPrihy v. Board of Re_v_i_e'I/. 567 P. 2d 626 (Utah, 1977). 
A1,pel I ant relies on Goc_k_e_, as support for her contention that 
n·r >1urf search was adequate. See page 12 of Appellant's Brief. However, 
.,,,eke is distinguishable in that the claimant therein was not advised as to 
the extent of work search she should be making. The claimant in Gocke relied 
'J'I thf' "Handhook for Claimant" which, when read literally, "doesn't require 
d"Y attirmative action by a claimant other than registration." Id. at 46. 
In the present case, however, Appellant was advised as to the extent of work 
''"arch she should he making and understood fully what would constitute an 
1ctivr· pffort to secure employment. The United States District Court for 
the District of Connecticut stated in Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp. 922 
(1.onn., 1973), cited on page 24 of Appellant's Brief: 
[I]f a stated number of employers must be visited, a 
claimant's acknowledgment that he had seen fewer than 
the required number would eliminate the factual con-
troversy and provide an adequate basis for denial of 
benefits. 
In the present case, when Appellant initially filed for benefits, she 
"'Jned Jnd received a copy of the "Responsibilities While Claiming Benefits" 
1r1,1 1·1h1(h µr,uv1des: 
- 5 -
Seek work - I wi 11 make an active et fort to look for 
f u l l t i me wo r k ea ch week a n d w i I l fo l l ow u p on a n y Job 
leads I am given by Job Service. An active effort, in 
part means I will ly contact e_lllfl_loyers who 
would hire people in myoccupat1o·n-:-FailureT6 do so 
may be considered as evidence that I do not have a 
genuine desire to find immediate employment. (R.0065. 
Emphasis added.) 
She also certified to the following statement on her initial claim' 
I understand that I must personally seek work and be 
able and available to accept full-time work-:- I have 
received the U. I. Claimant Guide explaining my rights 
and responsibilities. (R.0066. Emphasis added.) 
The U. I. Claimant Guide, referred to as the Handbook, pro,-
Make an active effort to look for work. An active effort 
means that you should contact several employers in per-
son each week who would hire people in your occupational 
field. Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide, page 7, 
1982. (Emphasis added) 
Several obviously means more than one, and that Appellant read the:';-
book and understood the work search requirements is appparent from her tt· 
mony: 
Referee: Okay. What was your understanding based 
on your reading of the Handbook and reading 
Exhibit #2 ["Responsibilities While Claiming 
Benefits" form] of the responsibilities or 
the work search requirements imposed by the 
Department of Employment Security? What did 
you understand that you needed to do to re-
main eligible for unemployment insurance as 
far as work search? 
Claimant: To make at least two to three contacts a week. 
Referee: Did you understand the ••• how those con-
tacts were to be made? 
Claimant: Yes. 
- 6 -
Ref Pree· What was your understanding of how they were 
to be made? 
Claimant: That I should make about, at least, two to 
three contacts a week in person and you know, 
minimum. (R.0041) 
With such a clear understanding as to what would suffice as the minimal 
1oh sedrch, Appellant nevertheless made only one in-person contact during 
the three weeks between October 3, 1982 and October 21, 1982 {R.0064) and 
only one in-person contact during the twelve days between November 27, 1982 
and December 9, 1982. (R.0036) These two in-person contacts were supple-
mented by six telephone contacts. (R.0064) This fact situation appears 
almost analogous to the situation in Hurd v. Board of Review, 638 P. 2d 544 
(Utah, 1981), wherein this Court held that a claimant who had contacted only 
three businesses for the purpose of finding work during a 30 day period, was 
not entitled to unemployment compensation because his efforts showed only a 
"passive search for work" even though he alleged in his appeal to the Board 
of Review that he had made "numerous telephone cal ls pursuant to want ad 
listings." Id. at 545. 
Accordingly, Appellant's sporadic and limited employer contacts in the 
µresent case and particularly her failure to pursue in-person contacts, are 
inconsistent with an unequivocal exposure to the labor market and do not 
show a yood faith effort to secure employment. Therefore, this Court is 
J'"l 1fierl in supporting the decision of the Appeal Referee as affirmed by 
,,,,. 11oud 0f Review to deny benefits and assess the overpayment. 
- 7 -
PO I NT I I I 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT APPELLANT CONTACT 2 TO 3 POTENTIAL lM-
PLOYERS IN PERSON EACH WEEK IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW AND IS 
REASONABLE. 
The Appellant contends that the Industrial Commission has applied 
1
• 
rigid and inflexible manner the so-called "2 to 3 in person contact 'ui. 
However, that requirement is only an interpretive guideline that is roe• 
ered viable in most occupations and areas, but is not applied rigid 
1 
inflexibly in all cases. That the Industrial Commission and the Depart•-
have the authority to make such interpretations of the Utah Employment 
rity Act and issue such guidelines, has been affirmed by this Court in,. 
Lake City Corporation v. Board of Review, 657 P. 2d 1312 (Utah, . 
• . • Furthermore, where agency decisions deal with tech-
nical questions which call for the exercise of expertise, 
born either of a technical background and training or 
long experience in dealings with numerous, similar prob-
lems, we also accord deference to an agency interpreta-
tion because of the necessity to recognize discretion 
commensurate with the nature of the issue, as defined by 
the general purposes of the Act, although the latitude 
accorded may vary with the nature of the issue. 
With Utah unemployment compensation claims as high as 35,000 dJ'" 
particular week, and in recognition of the d1 fficulty involved in the V 
adjudication and payment week by week of benefits, it is only naturai · 
the Department would issue guidelines which are applicable even 
to all similarly situated claimants subject to the work search requ1r 11 
of Section 35-4-4(c) of the Act. 
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lhe rn1 n1mal requirement placed upon claimants to contact 2 to 3 pot en-
'rl r0 rnplorrs Pach week in person is both reasonable and is supported by 
casP law trorn other jurisdictions. See Jones v. Administrator, Unemployment 
Conrpensat ion 228 A. 2d 807 (Conn. 1966); Redd v. Texas Unemployment Com-_ 
pensation A_c_t, 431 S.W. 2d 16 (Tx., 1968); Carr v. Administrator, Unemployment 
ComrJPnsat1on __ A_c_t, 223 A. 2d 313 (Conn., 1966). 
Considering the purpose of the work search requirement, and the require-
rnent of D_e_n_bl'_, supra, that a claimant must be unequivocally exposed to the 
labor market and must show more than a passive willingness to gain employ-
rnent, the requirement in this case that Appellant contact at least two poten-
tial employers each week, is reasonable and consistent with the generalized 
viork search requirement contained in the Utah Employment Security Act. As 
noted above, Appellant received and understood the work search instructions. 
That she was able to comply is apparent, because for that period in which she 
was al lowed benefits, Appellant did contact at least three potential employ-
eG in person each week. 
POINT IV 
THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH THE COMMISSION TERMINATED UNEMPLOYMENT 
eENEFITS TO THE CLAIMANT DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
llµpellant contends in her Brief at Point Ill that she was denied unem-
'1yrnvr1f hPnl'f1ts without prior notice and without opportunity for a Goldberg 
r,-'r ly !YI'" rif hearing before termination of benefits. In support of this 
- 9 -
contention claimant cites the cases of v. Fusa_ri, supra, ar,,, 
Dep_a_r_!_ment_._of __ H_[Jm_an __ R_esci_u_r:_ce_s__O.ev_e_!_o_grne_n_t v. 402 u .S. I 21 
Appellant explains the Fji_s_a_r2 case as holding that the "seated intP· 
system did not provide sufficient procedural due process protectir,,_ 
unemployment insurance claimants. A cursory review of the District 
Opinion would lead one to that conclusion. The District Court heiG 
the Connecticut procedures for determining unemployment insurance eligit-
violated due process as follows: 
••. because (a) a property interest has been denied 
(b) at an inadequate hearing (c) that is not reviewable 
de novo until an unreasonable length of time. 364 F. 
Supp., at 937-938. 
The Connecticut legislature thereafter amended the review provisw 
its unemployment insurance law. The U. S. Supreme Court remanded thP 
to the District Court to determine whether the new provisions improve·· 
time factor sufficiently to make the entire process legally sufficient,;· 
i ng: 
Prompt and adequate administrative review provides an 
opportunity for consideration and correction of errors 
made in initial eligibility determinations. Fusari v. 
Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379,389, 95 S.Ct. 533,540--;-<rZT.Ed. 
521 (1975). 
Thus a careful reading of the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
case clearly shows that the Court was primarily concerned with the lenf 
delay in obtaining proper review of a denial of benefits. This concer· 
subsequently specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in the c,ie 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), citing f"__u2_d_r-_i at 906. 
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1 d1',oh1\ity insurance case, involved the precise issue to which Appellant 
,,p»oh in Puint III of her Brief, that is, whether an individual claiming 
'•overnment benefits under an entitlement program may be denied such bene-
fies without a Go_l__d_b_e_rjL v. type hearing. 
In analyzing the issue presented, the Eldridge court set forth the 
factors to be considered in determining the amount of due process required 
1n such cases, as follows: 
Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the admin-
istrative procedures provided here are constitutionally 
sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and 
private interests that are affected. [Citations omitted] 
More precisely our prior decisions indicate that identi-
fication of the specific dictates of due process gener-
ally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official actions; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or a substitute 
procedural safeguard; and finally, the government's 
interests, including the function involved and the fiscal 
dnd administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail. [Citing 
G_o_l_d_b_e_rl! v. Kelly] 
The Court then proceeded to analyze the individual interest involved 
in the case, stating: 
Only in Goldberg has the court held that due process 
hearing prior to a temporary 
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare 
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of 
subsistence; "the crucial factor in this context -
a factor not present in the case of •.. virtually 
anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended -
is that termination of aid pending resolution of a 
rontroversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible 
recipient of the very means by which to live while he 
waits. 397 U.S., 254,264, 90 S.Ct. 1011,1018 (Emphasis 
1n original)." Eligibility for disability benefits, 
- 11 -
in contrast, is not based upon financial nePd. In-
deed, it is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or 
support from many other sources, such as Parni ngs of 
other family members, workmen's compensation awards, 
court claims awards, savings, private insurance, public 
or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, 
public assistance, or the "many other important pro-
grams both public and private, which contain provisions 
for disability payments affecting a substantial portion 
of the work force. " [Footnotes and Citations 
omitted. 96 S.Ct., at 905] 
After considering the other two factors previously referred to, 1 _ 
court concluded that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to· 
termination of disability benefits. 
The holding that pre-termination evidentiary hearings are not req1,·, 
was extended to unemployment insurance cases by Graves v. 41\: 
Supp. 40 (E.D. Mo., 1977), affirmed 431 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2164, 53 L.' 
2d 220 ( 1977). See al so Torres v. New York State JJJ · 
Supp. 431 (S.D.N.Y., 1971 ), affirmed 405 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 1185, 31 L.Ed. 
228 (1972). 
Appellant's reliance on California Department of Human 
opment v. Java, supra, is likewise misplaced. The Java case involvedap•-
cedure whereby an employer could sit back and await an initial 
of a claimant's eligibility for unemployment benefits. If the determina11 
found the claimant eligible, the employer could then appeal, thus cau1i0g' 
termination of the claimant's benefits pending the outcome of the e111pioy' 
appeal. Such appeals took a median of seven to ten weeks to resolve. 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Java that the suspension of unemployment uen-· 
for such a lengthy period, · 
- 1 2 -
,iulJterJ duP process. ln the instant case the termination of Appellent's 
ho•npt1ts was not initiated by an appeal of another party, but rather was 
1-,ctserl on the claimant's own statements in an eligibility review. (R.0063-
0064). The eligibility review is an administrative device by which benefit 
claimants are periodically asked to prove their eligibility consistent with 
Rule A?l-07-2:1.e.(l), General Rules of Adjudication. Appellant was notified 
of the eligibility review and appeared as requested by the local office. 
(R.0063-0064) Thereafter Appellant received a notice of denial of benefits 
which she appealed in a timely manner to an Appeal Referee. (R.0060-0061) 
Appellant was given a notice of the appeal hearing setting forth the time, 
date, place and issues to be covered. (R.0059) As required by Section 35-4-
10, U.C.A. 1953, Appellant was given a full evidentiary hearing within four 
weeks from the date she was denied benefits (R.0014) A decision from that 
hearing was issued to the Appellant within four weeks. This procedure af-
forded Appellant the full due process of law required by Eldridge. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Appeal Referee, as affirmed by the Board of Review, 
1s in compliance with statutory law, case law and Respondent's regulations. 
The evidence in support of this decision substantially exceeds the test of 
Mem_b_er_s _of __ l_r_Q_n_ Workers Uni on of Provo, supra at 211, which requires this 
(nurt to sustain the determinations of the Board of Review if there is evi-
ir'r1re of <lny substance whatever which can reasonably be regarded as support-
'"4 those determinations. 
- l 3 -
Inasmuch as Appellant failed to comply with the w<Jrk search riite 




Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1983. 
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